Both Kofman and Wilber needlessly confuse the issue. Kofman offers a detailed (and tedious) case that amounts to distinctions without a real, practical differences. No one could persuasively argue that objects have a consciousness (though I know there are such arguments out there, but so are flat-earth theories) and so hierarchies of objects are taken as such without need for such detailed clarification that, in fact, these are different than hierarchies about human culture and consciousness. That basically is, like, duh.

And his point that objects are created by the level of consciousness of the creator is something I generally agree with, but it doesn't take away from the objective hierarchy that an object/holon is part of. This direction is an important component of a discussion about artwork semiotics (which is what a hierarchy of objects inevitably leads towards), which is introduced in my essay, Polysemy. But strictly speaking, consciousness is irrelevent to this matter, because an artwork is a holon, no matter what.

With regard to Wilber, his case is all over the map. Mark Edwards has suitably shown this to be the case. With specific regard to "artwork as holon", I took this up on a conference call with Wilber two years ago, and he was still offering confusing accounts of holons (and all ideas he associates with holons—heaps, artifacts, individual/social). I sought a bit of clarity but ended up feeling it best for me to simply craft an argument based upon my conclusion on the matter. So I suggest to keep it simple. Define holon in the most basic terms (something whole that is also a part of some other whole), and then define subsequent distinctions as necessary (sentient vs non-sentient, for example).

An artwork, no matter the quality, depth of beauty, or consciousness of the creator, is a holon, no exceptions. Objectively the poem, song, building, ballet is a whole 'thing' (it is 'framed' in some way), and it is also part of a larger whole 'thing', such as the overall body of the discipline (poetry, music, architecture, dance, and so on, taken en masse and historically). There are also smaller wholes within the piece of art. A music composition is made up of notes, rhythms, timbres, etc. This makes sense, since to say that a single artwork is a whole implies that there are parts within it. (And more provocatively, McLuhan suggests that the content of every medium is another medium (the content of film is novel/narrative; the content of a written poem is typography; and so on, but this is too complicated for this particular argument.)

That you have to be very careful in the terms you use to discuss artwork holons (which are, also, artifacts) compared to, for example, human holons, is elementary, and should require no long explanation why. It should also be clear that Wilber's work primarily concentrates on the human holon (through broad psychological inquiry and assertion) and leaves discussion of non-sentient holons for, at best, a couple footnotes or toss off sentences here and there. This is a choice of his, one entirely his to make. Wilber has been confusing on the issue (confusingly forwarding the notion of artwork holons in EOS, then switching to an endorsement of Kofman's alternate view, that for intents and purposes does not consider artifacts to be holons). He acknowledged this in our conference call.

So again, I say keep it simple. An artwork is a holon, end of debate on the label; cue discussion of what the actual ramifications of that assertion are on the world of art, art education, artwork production, artist consciousness, and of course artwork interpretation - a far more interesting direction, or set of directions, all of which I address or aim to address in my own work. -- Matthew Dallman 13.Dec.2005